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A B S T R A C T
Russian political–economic development since the early 1990s has been described as one
of initial liberalization and subsequent re-etatization a decade later. Our paper critically
builds upon this view, systematically adding patrimonialism as third dimension and con-
ceptualizing Russia’s trajectory as varying with respect to ideal–typical liberalism, statism
and patrimonialism. We argue that Russian patrimonialism hindered the rise of the eco-
nomically facilitating state capacity and undermined both liberalization in the 1990s and
re-etatization in the 2000s.
Furthermore, we add a comparative BRICs perspective that clariﬁes the peculiarity of
Russia’s development based on statistical data from the World Bank, the OECD and Heri-
tage Foundation. The data conﬁrm the de-liberalization of Russia and show an increase of
patrimonialism. Another ﬁnding is that Russia was the only BRIC country that de-
liberalized and increased its level of patrimonialism in the period under consideration.
Copyright Copyright © 2017, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production
and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that Russia’s political economy1
underwent a liberalization in the 1990s, followed by re-
etatization in the 2000s (cf. Aslund, 2007; Goldman, 2010;
Hanson, 2007; Rutland, 2008; Yakovlev, 2006). However,
further differentiation is required for a more exhaustive and
systematic analysis of change in Russia’s political economy
during the past two decades. Such differentiation is the ob-
jective of this study. It makes a case for supplementing the
better known statist and liberal dimensions of Russia’s tra-
jectory with systematic incorporation of a third dimension:
patrimonialism, understood as a distinct structural mode
of political–economic organization based on clientelism and
patronage. Many scholars acknowledge patrimonialism as
one of the deﬁning features of the Russian political economy
but have diﬃculties assessing its interactionwith the formal,
legal–rational aspects of the system (e.g. King, 2007;
Robinson, 2011; Sakwa, 2013). We build upon this schol-
arship and assess empirically the impact of patrimonialism
on Russia’s politico-economic development. We show how
patrimonialism undermined both the liberalization of the
1990s and the etatization of the 2000s and offer a quanti-
ﬁcation of the process.
In this paper we develop an analytical framework and
quantitative tools for comparatively exploring the speci-
ﬁcity of Russia’s political–economic development over the
past two decades. First, we systematically address change
by conceptualizing the trajectory of the Russian political
economy as a case that changed location in the ﬁeld between
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the liberal, statist and patrimonial ideal types. This ap-
proach differs both from static classiﬁcations (i.e. Russia
having, for example, ‘state-led capitalism’ (Lane, 2008) or
‘patrimonial capitalism’ (King, 2007)) and from analyses cited
above which focus on the shift from liberalization to
etatization but do not grant enough attention to the impact
of patrimonialism. Second, we quantify such develop-
ments in Russian political economy, placing it in a
comparative BRIC context and illuminating the particulari-
ties of Russia’s development.
In doing so, the paper builds on the literature on com-
parative capitalisms. We depart from predominant accounts
in the ﬁeld in two important respects. First, our approach
differs from static classiﬁcation of national political econo-
mies where large numbers of cases, including Russia and
other post-communist countries (e.g. Lane, 2005; Myant &
Drahokoupil, 2011), are crowded-together under the label
of one or another ‘type’, calling cases in plural, for example
LMEs (liberal market economies) or CMEs (coordinated
market economies). In such conceptualizations it is diﬃ-
cult to conceive of change other than a radical overhaul from
one ‘type’ to another (Thelen, 2004, p. 3). As an alterna-
tive view, we present a more dynamic approach by
distinguishing between ideal types of capitalism (theoret-
ical models) and empirical political economies (hybrid
cases). This distinction gives space to grasp nuances
and gradual change: an empirical case only approximates
an ideal type and contains elements of several types,
the proportion of which can change over time. Second,
our approach goes beyond the predominant accounts in
comparative capitalism scholarship by deploying an addi-
tional ideal type of capitalism – patrimonialism – which we
argue represents an alternative way of organization and
functioning of a political economy and is crucial for under-
standing the speciﬁcities of the BRICs and Russia in particular
(Becker, 2013). These points will be detailed in the next
section.
The paper clariﬁes Russia’s political–economic devel-
opment in these ways, through two distinct but interrelated
steps. The ﬁrst, historical–analytical step provides insight
into changes that occurred in the political economy of post-
communist Russia in the conceptual framework of three
ideal types of capitalism. The assessment is based on a crit-
ical reading of secondary literature supported by newspaper
articles and interviews with entrepreneurs conducted in
Russia in the spring of 2014. We make the case that Russia
experienced an attempt at liberalism in the 1990s, which
was followed by an attempt at statism in the 2000s. Both
processes were accompanied, and indeed undermined, by
patrimonialism. The study of the impact of patrimonialism
on the processes of liberalization and etatization is central
to the analysis. Notably, the attempted move toward greater
statism hardly implied a general strengthening of the state,
although it becamemore centralized and the extent of state
ownership and state activities increased. State capacity, un-
derstood broadly as the capacity to formulate and implement
policy, rose only in coercive terms, not in terms of facili-
tating economic development which involves creating
incentives for private entrepreneurialism, providing
legal certainty and improving education, R&D and the in-
frastructure (we dub it ‘facilitating state capacity’). The rise
of the facilitating state capacity has been hindered by
patrimonialism, notably the widespread patron–client ties
and private appropriation of the public realm by political
and bureaucratic agents.
The second step in the paper aims to ‘individualize’ (Tilly,
1984) Russian political economy in comparative BRICs per-
spective and to examine whether the direction of change
as identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step can be quantitatively re-
vealed. The BRIC countries are selected as comparison cases
since they are all large emerging and internationally sig-
niﬁcant political economies. No doubt there are notable
differences between the BRICs as regards size, historic lega-
cies and factor endowment, to name a few, which are
interesting for the purpose of comparison. For the purpose
of this research, however, we want to point out some
similarities between the BRICs. Figures of economic per-
formance, competitiveness and investment indicate growing
importance of these countries and imply a shift in global
economic power beyond the “hype initiated by the Goldman
Sachs BRICs…studies” (Nölke, ten Brink, Claar, &May, 2014,
p. 539). For instance, the share of the BRICs in global pro-
duction increased from 15% in 1995 to 25% in 2010
(International Monetary Fund, 2012). Politically, since 2009
the leaders of the BRICs2 have been meeting at annual
summits, aspiring to give emerging countries a stronger voice
in international governance and to advance an alternative
agenda on economic development, in particular through a
more pronounced role of the state.
The focus of the comparison will be on Russia: we do
not attempt a detailed treatment of other BRICs nor aim to
compare or explain in depth their trajectories. A general sta-
tistical comparison, however, is possible and appropriate,
using data provided from the Index of Economic Freedom, the
World Governance Indicators and theOECD on productmarket
regulation and employment protection legislation. Themain
ﬁnding is that the data conﬁrm the de-liberalization of Russia
and show an increase of patrimonialism. Another ﬁnding
is that both processes ran counter to the developments in
other BRIC countries. In terms of its trajectory of change
Russia is revealed to be an outlier: Russia was the only BRIC
country that de-liberalized in the 2000s compared to the
1990s, while India, China and, to a lesser extent, Brazil lib-
eralized in this time period. Russia was also notably the only
country that experienced a growth of patrimonialism, which
decreased in other BRICs.
In taking these two steps, the paper makes both theo-
retical and empirical contributions. In theoretical terms, the
paper contributes to efforts to incorporate patrimonialism
into the comparative capitalism framework. While the
concept of patrimonialism is widely deployed in studies of
political systems or governance regimes (e.g. Adams &
Charrad, 2011), it is seldom applied to the economic domain
(Robinson, 2011, and Schlumberger, 2008, being among the
notable exceptions), although it shapes to a considerable
degree the organization of the political economies of emerg-
ing markets.
2 The club was extended by South Africa in 2010, which is not in-
cluded in the study due to the lack of necessary data for the time period
considered.
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In empirical terms, the paper provides a systematic anal-
ysis of change in the Russian political economy within an
original conceptual framework and offers a tool for the quan-
titative assessment of that change. The incorporation
of patrimonialism in the framework allows to become
more precise than the existing analyses on the scope of
patrimonialism and its impact on other dimensions of Rus-
sia’s trajectory. In particular, scholars recognize that Russia
combines both legal–rational and patrimonial features
(e.g. Sakwa, 2013; Whitmore, 2010) but have diﬃculty as-
sessing “this complex interaction” (Whitmore, 2010, p.
1003).3 We want to contribute to this research agenda by
offering qualitative and quantitative assessments of how
patrimonialism interacts with other, legal–rational ele-
ments (liberalism and statism), and how this affects the
development of the political economy as a whole. The con-
ceptual framework is applicable to other political economies
given the data are available.
The empirical contribution offers an attempt to estab-
lish with the best available data and with some precision
the character and development of political economies as
conceptualized with respect to patrimonialism, liberalism
and etatism. Social scientiﬁc texts often talk of ‘more or less’;
we try to be somewhat more precise, even if the available
data are not perfect and we generally should not confuse
social sciences with physics. Interpretation and estima-
tion are the main ingredients of social–scientiﬁc research,
they express the complex, interdependent character of social
reality and should not be ‘analyzed away’ (Hall, 2003, p. 386)
by reducing the latter to independent and dependent vari-
ables. Of course, our empirical contributionmust comewith
more-than-the-usual caveats regarding data availability and
limited precision (see the discussion in Section 3.1). Nev-
ertheless, the measures presented in this article are to date
the only suitable available data for a comparative politico-
economic analysis of the BRICs, and Russian political
economy in particular.
The next section will set forth the conceptual frame-
work. It will present the criteria for creating the typology
and explain the construction of ideal types, granting par-
ticular attention to patrimonialism. The section that
follows discusses the sources of the persistence of Rus-
sia’s patrimonialism, providing a background for the
subsequent historical analysis of Russia in terms of ideal–
typical liberalism, statism and patrimonialism. The following
section quantiﬁes Russia’s development in the compara-
tive BRICs context. Finally, in the conclusion we summarize
the argument and reﬂect on the broader impact of the study.
1.1. Conceptual framework: liberal, statist and patrimonial
ideal types
We suggest a typology of capitalist varieties as a tool to
comparatively individualize political economies. Typology
is a means to ease comparative analysis: it reduces the dif-
ferences between the empirical cases to a few fundamental
ones. In the Weberian tradition we distinguish ideal types
and empirical cases. Ideal types are theoretical models based
on comparative empirical knowledge which represent a tool
to ease comparative analysis. Empirical cases, by contrast,
are hybrids that only approximate ideal types to a certain
degree and contain elements of more than one type; over
time cases may change location in the ﬁeld between the
ideal types. Therefore the distinction between ideal types
and empirical cases is a requirement for making gradual
change in a given political economy intelligible, as well as
gradual differences between the countries (Becker, 2009, p.
44ff; Crouch, 2005).
We construct our typology based on two criteria that
point to fundamental features of a political economy and
its working – primarily, state–economy relationship and, sec-
ondarily, capital–labor relationship, which cover most of the
institutional components in the comparative capitalism lit-
erature. The state–economy relationship is at the heart of
every political economy and includes the character of eco-
nomic policy, employment protection and the welfare
dimension, product-market regulation, privatization/
nationalization of ﬁrms and the (non-)regulation of wages,
supply and demand (Becker, 2013, p. 34). The capital–
labor relationship is the most fundamental cleavage
in capitalism and includes the union–employer and
management–employee relations and, connected to this, cor-
porate governance and stakeholder–shareholder relations
(Becker, 2013; cf. Schmidt, 2002, p. 107f). Our typology is
conceived for the analysis of the entire range of capitalist
variety and contains ﬁve ideal types. Relevant for the
analysis of Russia are three of them: liberal, statist and pat-
rimonial types of capitalism.4 The liberal type has never been
disputed since capitalism is basically a market economy and
therefore to a substantial degree liberal. Two other non-
liberal ideal types – statist and patrimonial – emerge from
our decision to abandon the predominant dichotomous con-
struction of liberal versus coordinated type (we prefer to
call the latter type, in the tradition of Polanyi, 1957, ‘em-
bedded’). We argue that the embedded ideal type of
capitalism is a catch-all concept that conceals fundamen-
tal distinctions and needs differentiation. Therefore we split
the embedded type – where the market is embedded in po-
litically or culturally induced non-market conﬁgurations –
into the statist and patrimonial types. Both statism (Schmidt,
2002, p. 108f, also uses this concept) and patrimonialism
are plausible choices since they play a role in a large number
of political economies, notably emerging ones.
Based on this conceptualization, we deﬁne the pro-
posed three ideal types of capitalism as follows. In the liberal
ideal type the market is conceived as governing every
aspect of the economy, and politics unrestrictedly facili-
tates private property and the market – apart from basic
legal and social regulations. State interventionism is limited,
industrial relations tend to be individualized and workers
as well as companies are commodiﬁed. The USA and other
3 For instance, in her study of parliamentary oversight in Russia,
Whitmore merely ﬁnds that “the equilibrium between legal–rational and
patrimonial spheres of the state shifted toward the prevalence of the pat-
rimonial during Putin’s presidency” (Whitmore, 2010, p. 1022).
4 The typology furthermore contains the corporatist type (relevant for
instance in Brazil), where capital and labour cooperate on macro-
economic policy, and the meso-communitarian type (relevant for example
in South Korea or Japan), where management and labour in huge busi-
ness conglomerations form a community (cf. Becker, 2013).
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Anglo-Saxon political economies approximate the liberal idea
type. Any move to strengthen private property and the
market in any given country is also a move in the liberal
direction.
In the statist ideal type the market is restricted by po-
litical regulation which intends to determine the course of
the economy. By implication, the state capacity to facili-
tate economic development must be high. Importantly, like
in the liberal type, the state acts on the basis of universal-
istic norms. The state assumes to know best what the
common interest is and state-owned ﬁrms might have
a prominent place in the economy. The preponderant
conception of organization and decision-making is hierar-
chical and the rights of labor are limited. Emerging political
economies that have chosen a state-directed course of de-
velopment feature a considerable degree of statism.
The patrimonial ideal type deserves a longer treat-
ment. While not part of the conventional comparative
capitalism framework, it is central to the understanding of
political economies of non-OECD countries. The notion of
patrimonialism goes back to Max Weber (1972). Weber
looked at pre-modern societies like Imperial China, late
Roman Empire and Tsarist Russia and constructed ideal–
typical patrimonialism as a state–society nexus consisting
of personal hierarchical relationships based on loyalty and
mutual services between rulers and ruled and without a
strict distinction between public and private (Weber, 1972,
pp. 580–653). The patrimonial set-up derives from a house-
hold administration of a chief who grants clients tax-
farming opportunities in the form of prebends, ﬁefs or the
like. According toWeber, themain feature of patrimonialism
is private appropriation of resources by those who hold po-
litical power and enjoy corresponding economic rights.
Weber described patrimonial state administration as based
on interpersonal rather than impersonal relations of au-
thority and thus sharply demarcated it from the universalist
rational bureaucratic state (Weber, 1972, pp. 586, 598).
The concept of patrimonial rule gained prominence in
social sciences since the 1960s in the study of Latin America,
Asia and later also Africa (Bach, 2011). The ambivalence
related to the application of a concept associated with tra-
ditional rule to modern states was resolved by Eisenstadt
(1973), who coined the concept of neo-patrimonialism.
The preﬁx ‘neo-’ came to deﬁne the co-existence of
legal–rational and patrimonial elements within a political
system (we do not opt for the term because in our concep-
tion it is empirical cases that are mixed while ideal types
are pure). At the same time, (neo-)patrimonialism at-
tained a negative connotation as it came to be associated
with predatory, ‘anti-developmental’ forms of politics (Bach,
2011, p. 279ff).
We provide a slightly different perspective on
patrimonialism, deploying the concept to denote not a state
administration or governance type but an ideal type of po-
litical economy. We argue that patrimonialism qualiﬁes as
a separate ideal type for two reasons. First, rather than being
an incidental feature of certain social arrangements,
patrimonialism is a distinct structural principle of the
politico-economic organization of a society as a whole,
affecting both criteria for the construction of an ideal
type, as detailed below (Becker, 2013, p. 36). Second,
patrimonialism qualiﬁes as an ideal type of its own because
of its salience in most political economies outside
North-Western Europe and its former American and Ocea-
nian settler colonies (cf. Adams & Charrad, 2011; on
patrimonialism in post-communist states, see Bach, 2011,
p. 286f).
In our deﬁnition, the core organizing principle of ideal–
typical patrimonial capitalism is patron–client relations
between political and economic elites, which deeply pen-
etrate the social fabric. The ruling groups regard society as
their own private domain; the lack of distinction between
oﬃce and oﬃce-holder allows private appropriation of
public resources for personal gain (Kohli, 2004). The state
intervenes in the economy on the basis of political consid-
erations and particularistic gains (unlike in the statist type
where the state regulates the economy based on univer-
salistic rules). By the same token, managers regard the
fulﬁllment of corporate functions as a legitimate means to
their own personal enrichment. Capital–labor relations are
based on clientelistic arrangements between managers and
employees rather than on institutionalized interaction. The
economy is typically reliant on rents (e.g. from natural re-
sources) which are central for the survival of patrimonial
capitalism, sustaining the rent-seeking ruling elite and
cronies in business and at the same time enabling patron-
age of the society.
Patrimonialism may undermine the common good and
economic development: proprietorial oﬃce holding can be
associated with corruption, while the state may become a
‘vehicle through which rapacious elite groups comman-
deer the resources and property of others’ (Robinson, 2013b,
p. 193). Patrimonial exchanges above a certain level are said
to weaken the facilitating state capacity (see, for example,
Kohli, 2004, p. 9) as well as competition and meritocratic
principles, and therefore may undermine the eﬃcacy of the
market and the economy as a whole. However, one should
be careful with this argument because China, despite its
strong patrimonialism (cf. further Table 5 and McNally,
2012), demonstrates the ability to trigger technological pro-
gress. Chinese patrimonialism could have facilitated
economic development in periods of reformwhen space for
entrepreneurial initiative was bought by business people
bribing state oﬃcials (cf. Gregory & Zhou, 2009, p. 5). Ex-
amples of Indonesia and the Asian Tigers also indicate a co-
existence of patrimonialism and successful economic
development (Bach, 2011, p. 284f).
How do we account for the process of politico-economic
change in our conceptual framework? To recapitulate, we
conceive of empirical cases as hybrids that contain ele-
ments of different ideal types; liberal ideal type of capitalism
is conceptualized as opposite to the two embedded types,
namely, statism and patrimonialism. Therefore, in our con-
ception change is a shift in the proportion of elements of
ideal types in an empirical case: liberalization implies a de-
crease of statist and/or patrimonial elements in a political
economy; conversely, de-liberalization implies a move-
ment into the direction of either increasing statism or,
alternatively, patrimonialism (or an increase of both).
To sum up, our conceptual approach seems well-suited
to comparatively analyze change in the political econo-
mies of the BRICs. First, it allows capture of gradual change
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through the distinction between empirical cases and ideal
types of capitalism. Second, it systematically integrates
patrimonialism, characteristic of politico-economic orga-
nization in most emerging economies, and accounts for its
impact on the process of politico-economic change.
In the following sectionwewill analyze Russia’s political–
economic development since the break-up of the Soviet
Union in 1991 in the framework of the suggested three ideal
types of capitalism. Our focus will lie on the implications
of patrimonialism for the processes of liberalization and sub-
sequent etatization. The section will serve as a basis for the
second part of the paper, which provides a quantitative as-
sessment of the identiﬁed developments in Russian
capitalism in a comparative BRIC context.
2. The trajectory of the Russian political economy
reconsidered
2.1. The legacy of patrimonialism
The legacy of patrimonialism extends back to the origins
of Russian statehood. The sources of the persistence of
patrimonialism can be roughly divided into two catego-
ries – ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’, associated with politico-
economical and socio-cultural factors, respectively.
‘Top down’ explanations of the endurance of Russian
patrimonialism revolve around factors associated with the
state and the legacy of politico-economic organization such
as the tradition of authoritarian rule, the lack of private prop-
erty (Pipes, 1999) and the historical continuity of social
structure based on clientelistic relations and particularis-
tic exchange (Robinson, 2013a). For instance, the social
structure of Muscovite and later Tsarist Russia developed
the system of kormlenie, or ‘feeding’: the monarch, who was
literally the possessor of all Russia, granted land (pomestye,
or prebend) to the nobility in exchange for their service and
loyalty (Pipes, 1999, p. 160). This clientelistic system became
further entrenched under socialism: the communist state
and the party controlled all signiﬁcant property and del-
egated its administration to the nomenklatura – holders of
key administrative positions, whose appointment had to be
approved by the Communist Party and thus embodied the
principle of patronage. In this hierarchical and highly per-
sonalized system, the executives of state-owned enterprises
took advantage of the opportunities for enrichment under
the auspices of their party patrons (Solomon, 2008, p. 81ff).
More generally, the speciﬁcities of the Soviet economic
system encouraged transactions that were not monetized,
like in a market economy, but rather represented particu-
laristic exchanges based on acquaintance and trust, which
allowed members of elite networks to convert power re-
sources into other goods and services (Robinson, 2013a, p.
20ff).
In light of the politico-economic explanations,
patrimonialism outlived the collapse of the Soviet Union due
to the continuity of the system of particularistic exchange:
barter and the factual preservation of soft budget con-
straints allowed enterprises to stay aﬂoat in the 1990s
(Robinson, 2013a). In this way economic elites preserved
their political power and used their connections for
Table 1
Index of Economic Freedom, 1998 and 2008; selected indicators (range 0–100).






1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008
Brazil 45.5 44.1 70 54.0 81.6 62.0 33 40 53.9 65.6 30 33
China 39.6 40.5 55 50.3 88.2 78.1 33 30 42.0 50.1 24 33
India 36.4 42.3 55 50.9 78.5 74.6 30 30 31.6 60.5 26 33
Russia 48.1 38.6 55 53.7 70.8 74.4 70 40 54.3 37.1 26 25
USA 73.7 82.1 85 92.6 62.3 81.3 70 80 74.2 83.4 77 73
Source: Heritage Foundation, 2012.
aAverage of 7 of 10 indicators (monetary freedom, property rights and labor freedom – only data for 2008 – are excluded).
bRegarding the BRICs this indicator only counts for 50% in the calculation of the average.
Table 2
Product market regulation and employment protection legislation.
Product market regulationa Converted PMRc Employment protectiona,b Converted EPLc
1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008
Brazil (2.00) 1.94 66.7 67.7 2.6d 2.3 58.4 61.7
China (3.40) 3.30 43.3 45.0 3.0d 2.7 50.0 55.0
India (3.71) 2.75 47.5 54.1 2.8d 2.3 53.3 61.7
Russia (2.34) 3.09 61.0 48.5 1.9d 1.9 68.2 68.2
USA 1.28 0.84 78.7 86.0 0.7 0.7 80.0 83.0
Sources: Employment protection: OECD Library (n.d.); OECD, 2010, p. 171 (BRICs 2003); product market regulation: OECD Statistics Portal (n.d.).
aScale 0 (no regulation/protection) – 6 (fully regulated/protected); the scores for the BRICs in 1998 are estimated on the basis of their development in
the IEF.
bVersion 2.
c6 minus PMR and EPL score respectively multiplied by 100/6.
d2003.
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appropriating state assets during Soviet unraveling, hin-
dering the liberalization, as will be addressed in the next
section. Moreover, due to the high level of elite continuity
– as of 2001 nearly 60% of federal oﬃcials were hired during
communism (Brym & Gimpelson, 2004, p. 109ff) – modern
Russia inherited the patrimonial character of the Soviet
public administration and the proprietorial oﬃce holding
resembling the system of kormlenie (Fisun, 2012, p. 91). The
system of particularistic exchange endured in the 2000s
despite the consolidation of the political power: access to
wealth and economic resources followed from connec-
tions and proximity to power, rather than possession of
money (Robinson, 2013a). Under president Putin, patron–
client relations in Russia’s political economy ﬂourished and
became further entrenched due to the favorable economic
situation, which implied an increase of assets that could be
distributed. Given Russia’s dependence on hydrocarbons and
other primary exports, factors associated with the ‘re-
source curse’ (e.g. Ellman, 2006) as well as rent-distribution
from the hydrocarbon sector to the industry (Gaddy & Ickes,
2013) may have further contributed to the entrenchment
of patrimonialism.
‘Bottom up’ accounts of the endurance of Russian
patrimonialism explore its socio-cultural sources, for in-
stance deep-seated societal attitudes such as paternalism
and social passivity (Dubin, Gudkov, & Levinson, 2008), the
Soviet legacy of ‘doublethink’ and ‘doubledeed’ (Ledeneva,
2013) and, crucially, the traditional prevalence of infor-
mal practices (Ledeneva, 2006) and the existence of a
vast shadow sphere in public life. The engrained prefer-
ence for informal arrangements and ways to circumvent the
law historically evolved as an adaptation strategy to the over-
regulating and often arbitrary Russian state in line with the
popular wisdom that reads ‘rigidity of our laws is compen-
sated by their non-observance’. Thereby the traditional
response to illicit activities has been promulgation of ever
more rigid laws, which has exacerbated the vicious circle
by promoting further circumvention. For instance, in Soviet
times, unwritten rules and informal practices proliferated
as people struggled to adapt to the perennial shortage and
an oppressive legal system in which legality (zakon) and
justice (spravedlivost) were often far apart. Similarly, in the
1990s informal practices thrived given the deteriorating
living standard, poor law enforcement and proliferation of
crime (Ledeneva, 2006).
The policies of the Putin administration and the in-
creased living standard in the 2000s, however, have not
undermined informality and patron–client relations due to
the predominant socio-cultural attitude, or normality of in-
formality. Many of the informal practices are still regarded
normal in large parts of the Russian society, laws are rou-
tinely circumvented andmost formal institutions are utterly
mistrusted (Shlapentokh, 2006, p. 155f). Personal infor-
mal relations with local oﬃcials are perceived as vital
because they guarantee special treatment and help to
‘resolve issues’. OneMoscow businessman refers to it as ‘ad-
ministrative resource’: ‘When you become big [business],
you have friends in the procuracy, the investigation com-
mittee, the ministry of the interior…No need to pay bribes
to anyone.’ (interviewwith B23). However, corruption is en-
trenched, along the motto ‘I never bribe traﬃc police. Only
if they want to take away my driving license!’ (interview
with B16). Corrupt practices such as tax evasion (B8, B20,
B22), kickbacks (B7, B12) or bribery and the use of black cash
(B3, B14) are lamented yet sometimes considered inevita-
ble given the widespread notion that ‘everybody else
does it’. This bolsters the acceptance of informal practices,
turning them into the social norms of everyday life and
business operations. Normality is a crucial aspect since it
renders society inert and helps sustain the continuity of
patrimonialism.
2.2. Patrimonialism subverts liberalization
In the 1990s Russia moved toward liberalism by priva-
tizing large swaths of the formerly state-owned economy
and liberalizing the labor relations. However, patrimonialism
arguably subverted the liberalization process, having turned
the privatization of state assets from a classical liberal policy
into a particularistic appropriation of formerly state-
owned assets by politically-connected insiders, thus
perpetuating the traditional close link between power and
property.
Themajor beneﬁciaries of Russia’s privatization were the
Soviet-time enterprise managers (‘red directors’) and the
Russian bankers who later became known as the oli-
garchs. Both groups were able to appropriate lucrative assets,
thanks to their political connections back in Soviet times:
the red directors per se belonged to the former Soviet no-
menklatura, while the future oligarchs had links to it or to
the communist youth organization Komsomol and hence had
access to insider information and the ﬁnancial resources of
the Communist Party (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2005).
The appropriation of state assets by the insiders started
during Gorbachev’s perestroika, favored by the waning state
control and partial economic liberalization. This ‘sponta-
neous privatization’ allowed the oligarchs to make their ﬁrst
fortunes and the incumbent managers to reap proﬁts and
tap resources from state-owned enterprises without legally
owning them (Aslund, 2007, p. 57ff, 160). This paved theway
for further asset appropriation after the fall of the Soviet
Union in the course of privatization. Its ﬁrst round, the
voucher privatization of 1992, beneﬁtted primarily the
former enterprise managers, who had a vested interest
in protecting their de-facto ownership from re-allocation
and were ultimately able to seize control and effective
ownership of the companies they were managing (McFaul,
1995).
The second round of privatization, the ‘loans-for-shares’
auctions (1995–1997), was captured by the oligarchs, who,
thanks to the direct access to president Yeltsin, were able
to rig the auctions and obtain stakes of the country’s leading
enterprises at a fraction of their potential market value. In
order to secure their ill-gotten wealth, in 1996 the oli-
garchs ensured the re-election of the increasingly unpopular
Yeltsin through massive ﬁnancial and media support
(Goldman, 2010, p. 63ff). We conclude that the infamous
schemewas not only an instance of state capture by big busi-
ness, as the predominant assessment suggests (e.g. Yakovlev,
2006), but also a manifestation of patrimonialism because
it demonstrated the entrenchment of patron–client rela-
tions: the oligarchs, historically connected with the political
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establishment, ﬁnanced the latter and in return exerted in-
ﬂuence on political decision-making and received privileged
access to the most proﬁtable forms of entrepreneurship.
Overall, contrary to the intentions of the reformers, Rus-
sia’s privatization program did not create a full-ﬂedged
liberal market economy but rather implied twowaves of pat-
rimonial asset appropriation by well-connected insiders in
the context of a weak state.
Patrimonialism limited also the liberalization of the
capital–labor relations. Despite privatization and a dire ﬁ-
nancial situation many enterprises kept redundant workers
on the payroll since managers, who nurtured relation-
ships with government oﬃcials, were keen to secure their
own jobs and thus private access to resources (notewor-
thy, many troubled enterprises continued employing excess
workers only nominally, pushing them into the informal
economy). Rather than adapting to competitive market, en-
terprises pursued the system of particularistic exchange,
which implied rent seeking, spread of barter as well as
mounting payment arrears and proliferation of unpaid
leaves. Liberal reforms, especially minimum wage provi-
sions and regulations authorizing dismissals, were subverted
this way. Moreover, many ﬁrms routinely circumvented legal
provisions governing labor relations given the low enforce-
ment capacity of the state, leading to informalization of
employer–employee relations (e.g. employment without
formal contract, ‘envelope’ salaries etc.) (Kapelyushnikov,
2009, p. 20f).
Despite the deteriorating situation of the workers and
the legal recognition of the right to strike the level of in-
dustrial conﬂict remained low: instead of going on strike
workers preferred to rely on clientelistic arrangements with
the management, which gave them access to non-wage
supplements and covert earning schemes (Kapelyushnikov,
Kuznetsov, & Kuznetsova, 2012, p. 181ff). This perpetu-
ated the paternalistic ties between workers and managers
that used to be at the heart of the Soviet labor model and
hampered the transformation of trade unions into viable
workers’ organizations (Cook, 2012, p. 320). The holdover
communist-era union federation FNPR continued the old
practice of cooperation with the management and the state
rather than on defending workers’ rights, and concen-
trated on protection of union prerogatives as well as on
management of vast property inherited from Soviet times,
including prestigious premises, sporting facilities and holiday
resorts (Ashwin & Clarke, 2002, p. 90ff).
2.3. Patrimonialism undermines etatization
Patrimonialism not only had an impact on the process
of liberalization in the course of the 1990s, it also sub-
verted Russia’s turn to statism in the 2000s. Twomajor statist
policies of Putin’s administration – strengthening of the state
and nationalization in ‘strategic’ economic sectors (Goldman,
2010, p. 99ff) – were undermined by entrenched patron–
client ties between the state and business, even though the
terms of those relations were changed to the ﬁscal advan-
tage of the state (Robinson, 2013a, p. 194), and enabled
further appropriation of productive assets, notably by the
bureaucratic elites.
The policy of the strengthening of the state was ambig-
uous: on the one hand, the windfall from hydrocarbons
indeed allowed the president to bolster his political power,
to receive a larger basis for elite mobilization and to cen-
tralize the state (albeit at the expense of some democratic
freedoms); on the other hand, these moves concerned pri-
marily the coercive state capacity as illustrated by the
increased powers of the security agencies. At the same time,
the facilitating state capacity was undermined by
patrimonialism: clientelistic connections allowed Putin’s
friends or aides to advance into key positions in politics and
economy (Albats & Ermolin, 20115), while the implemen-
tation of ambitious socio-economic programs suffered from
administrative weakness and corruption. Proliferation of
kickbacks in public procurement is an illustration (Arkhipov
& Meyer, 2013; Makarov, 2011; Nemtsov, 2013), leading to
large-scale embezzlement and considerable ﬁnancial pres-
sure notably on small- and medium-sized companies. For
example, an owner of a small Moscow-based construction
ﬁrm laments: “If we win [a tender] with the known con-
tractors…, sometimes we come to an arrangement to reduce
their share [of the kickback]. … But bargaining does not
always work.” (interview with B7). Moreover, the state’s
ability to set strategic priorities, implement policies and act
innovatively and ﬂexibly was declining throughout the
2000s, from 6 out of 10 points in 2003 to 4.7 points in 2014
(Bertelsmann Transformation Index, various years, indica-
tor ‘steering capability’; in comparison, in 2014 the steering
capability was 5 points in China, 8.3 in Brazil and 7 in India).
Instead of routinely addressing arising problems, the state
often resorted to ‘manual steering’ which required the in-
volvement of the top political authority (Petrov, 2011).
The weakness of the facilitating state capacity can be
further illustrated by Russia’s ‘innovation gap’ to the ad-
vanced economies, which has increased in the decade up
to 2010 (Pro Inno, 2011; those of China and Brazil have nar-
rowed, and that of India has remained stable). Diversiﬁcation
of the economy away from hydrocarbons was not achieved:
Russia’s non-oil and non-gas exports have sharply de-
clined, as the negative trade balance ﬁgures reveal (Fig. 1),
and attempts to develop a vivid high-tech sector have not
been successful.
5 For the workings of Putin’s paternalism and system of governance, see
an excellent account by Ledeneva (2013).
Fig. 1. The Russian non-oil and -gas trade balance, 2000–2008. Source:
OECD, 2009, p. 9
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Patrimonialism further subverted another major statist
policy of Putin’s administration – nationalization in the
pivotal industries and concentration of strategic econom-
ic assets in state corporations. These moves do not appear
as genuine statist policies deemed to be in the public in-
terest for the sake of economic development. Rather they
appear as clientelistic re-distribution of property in favor
of the incumbent bureaucratic elites akin to Weber’s grant-
ing of prebends and tax-farming opportunities: loyal
incumbent members of the executive branch – foremost the
siloviki (oﬃcials of law-enforcement agencies) – were placed
on corporate boards of state companies, providing the of-
ﬁcials with access to budget funds and hence vast rent
seeking opportunities (Sakwa, 2013, p. 87).
The appropriation of assets by the bureaucratic elites was
facilitated by the legal environment marked by excessive
and often ambiguous business regulations. This encour-
aged circumvention and made the breach of some formal
rules inevitable (Yakovlev, 2006, p. 1048), thus making busi-
ness vulnerable: the Damoclean sword of sanctions was
hanging over virtually every entrepreneur. Moreover, busi-
ness was exposed to pressure by state oﬃcials who used
formal rules as a pretext for achieving personal goals. For
instance, bureaucratic extortion became commonplace, typ-
ically during tax inspections. In the words of a furniture
manufacturer from the provincial town of Kaluga, who faces
regular tax extortion, ‘[tax inspectors] comewith an obvious
“plan”: penalty strictly depends on your turnover.… The tax
collection plan deﬁnitely exists. I know for sure because I
talked to the folks from the tax authority.’ (interview with
B17). Doing business in many regions became contingent
on ‘cooperating’ with designated ‘aﬃliated ﬁrms’, owned
by local politicians’ relatives. Another businessman recalls
negotiating to build a factory in a provincial region: ‘The
mayor came and said: “We need a fountain. Costs – 10,000
Euro. You build a fountain at the city square and every-
thing will be good.” He gave us a company that builds
fountains, we paid to that company. As a result a small
puddle was built on the square and a huge fountain at the
mayor’s summer residence.’ (interview with B14).
Against the backdrop of patrimonialism, the strength-
ening of the coercive state capacity exacerbated the situation,
empowering state oﬃcials to subvert formal institutions,
such as courts and tax authorities, and to turn them into a
tool for legal harassment, expropriation and, ultimately,
private enrichment. The proliferation of illicit corporate
raiding – hostile takeovers of assets by means of physical
and administrative coercion – is a case in point (Rochlitz,
2013). The apparent increased involvement of the siloviki
in raiding in the course of the 2000s marks an informal re-
distribution of productive assets in favor of this group
(Ledeneva, 2013, p. 189ff).
Patrimonialism undermined also the development of the
capital–labor relations further on through the 2000s. Formal
policy was aimed at de-regulation: the new Labor Code,
adopted in 2002, on paper liberalized the labor relations and
introduced greater ﬂexibility in, among others, hiring and
ﬁring (Cook, 2012, p. 323). Also the enforcement of the labor
legislation improved compared to the 1990s. Nonetheless,
clientelistic arrangements continued to ﬂourish, demon-
strating the persisting gap between formal rules and the
actual practice. For instance, the ‘black-and-white sala-
ries’ proliferated both in private companies and in the public
sector where the black cash typically originated from kick-
backs in public procurement. Not ﬁxed in any contract, the
underhand ‘envelope payments’, which are estimated at
about 50% to the oﬃcial average wage, kept the labor costs
ﬂexible, at the same time enhancing the personal depen-
dence of theworkers on the employer (Kapelyushnikov et al.,
2012, p. 185). Similar to the 1990s, oftentimes workers
preferred to rely on paternalist relations with the manage-
ment and individual arrangements instead of collective
bargaining. Conspicuous labor quiescence in the 2000s was
also due to the fact that strikes became almost impossible
given the numerous restrictions in the new Labour Code,
while collective rights of unions eroded and the leading trade
union federation FNPR became incorporated into an alli-
ance with the ruling party, United Russia (Cook, 2012, p.
322ff).
On balance, the development of Russia’s political
economy in the 2000s implied a very speciﬁc turn toward
coercive statism blendedwith patrimonialism. The latter hin-
dered the rise of the economically facilitating state capacity
and subverted the policy of nationalization as well as the
institutionalization of capital–labor relations. Bureaucrat-
ic elites (including trade union functionaries) advanced as
the primary beneﬁciaries of this process, who were able to
use public property for personal aims and to tap the cash
ﬂow from private ﬁrms.
3. Russian development comparatively speciﬁed
The goal of this section is to become more precise on
identiﬁed political–economic changes in Russia. Howmuch
did Russian capitalism de-liberalize under Putin as com-
pared to the Yeltsin years, and which scope and impact did
patrimonialism have? To tentatively answer these ques-
tions we will make use of statistical data on Russia. To
determine the speciﬁcity of the Russian development, we
will also consider data of other three BRIC countries and the
USA as highly liberal contrast. To recapitulate, we work with
a two-stage typology: stage one is dichotomous and con-
sists of liberal and embedded capitalism, which is suﬃcient
to identify levels of (de-)liberalism; stage two differenti-
ates embedded capitalism into its statist and patrimonial
components.
3.1. Indicators, data and limited precision
The localization of empirical capitalist varieties and their
trajectories in the ﬁeld between the ideal types at time T1
and at T2 has to be based on data and features that indi-
cate the locations, such as for instance level of private
company ownership, political market regulation, tax pro-
gression, public expenditures, employment protection and
corruption. It has to be stressed that only some precision
of measurement is possible here since the indicators are
often ‘soft’ survey-based data, while qualitative data need
to be quantiﬁed. Regarding certain indicators or years data
are lacking and those available only crudely approximate
the relevant reality. Sometimes data are to some degree
‘subjective’ and comparisons lopsided. If not all indicators
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should have the same weight, what is the logic of differ-
entiation? Any quantiﬁcation of quality and any weighting
of indicators involve some degree of arbitrariness and there-
fore inevitably violate the principle of precision (cf. Becker,
2013).
The available data are based on surveys and law texts
and are collected by the Heritage Foundation (Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom; IEF), the OECD (indices of Product Market
Regulation [PMR] and Employment Protection Legislation [EPL])
and the World Bank (Worldwide Governance Indicators
[WGI]). These organizations have a liberal bias (the IEF, for
example, attributes extremely low scores for high levels of
public spending), but this does not distort every use of the
data. The PMR, EPL and IEF indices reveal a dichotomous
structure of market versus political regulation with the IEF,
adding corruption as third dimension. They are suitable for
the differentiation between liberal and embedded capital-
ism. Each of the IEF and the OECD data will count for one
half of the total liberal score. The score for embeddedness
is the residual one. This method is justiﬁed by the fact that
the indices run from totally liberal to totally non-liberal.
Therefore, the non-liberal score can be speciﬁed into the
score of embeddedness. TheWGI data measure effective po-
litical and judicial regulations and can help to differentiate
the residual score of embeddedness into statism and
patrimonialism. Here, where low statism corresponds with
high corruption levels, patrimonialism is the residual
category.6
3.2. Stage 1: the movement between liberal and embedded
capitalism
Let us start with the Index of Economic Freedom. It is the
broadest index and works with a scale of 0 to 100 of
‘freedom’/liberalism. The IEF is composed of ten single in-
dicators, each of them with the same weight: (1) business
freedom, (2) trade freedom, (3) ﬁscal freedom (taxation
level), (4) government spending, (5) monetary freedom (how
much inﬂation and political price distortion?), (6) invest-
ment freedom, (7) ﬁnancial freedom, (8) property rights
(legal protection of private property), (9) freedom from cor-
ruption and, since 2008, (10) labor freedom. So we have nine
indicators for 1998 and 2008 of which we will neither
include monetary freedom because it is strongly bound to
a certain idea of the causes of inﬂation and price distor-
tion nor property rights, which are an aspect of the rule of
law and accounted for in the WGI.
Attempting to soften the liberal bias of the IEF, we have
put together freedom of trade and freedom of investment,
because separately they would count too much as com-
pared to, for example, business or labor freedom. We also
merged the related ﬁscal freedom and government spend-
ing because taxation and public spending are highly related.
Moreover, the IEF gives very high scores to low spending.
The reasoning is the less a polity spends, the more liberal
it is. However, taxes and public spending are generally rel-
atively low in the BRICs. Given their stage of economic
development and social individualization this is quite
normal, particularly in China and even more in India, and
is hardly a result of liberal policy.
Thus, the selected indicators of the IEF are business
freedom (level of regulation of business operations); trade
freedom (level of trade restrictions) put together with in-
vestment freedom (easiness to invest; level of equality of
opportunity to invest); ﬁscal freedom (the taxation level) put
together with government spending; ﬁnancial freedom (the
business freedom of the ﬁnancial sector) and freedom from
corruption. Table 1 shows the scores.7
The table shows that the BRICs experienced a differen-
tiated development. The data show Russia having de-
liberalized, particularly in the sectors of ﬁnance, trade and
investment. Although not reﬂecting the nationalization of
some key industries, this development is roughly in line with
the account of the previous part of this paper that empha-
sized Russia having de-liberalized under Putin. It also shows
that the corruption level in Russia has remained stable and
is higher than that of the other BRICs.8 Overall, China appears
to have hardly changed, Brazil appears relatively stable
(though year-by-year data show it liberalizing until 2003
and then de-liberalizing – particularly due to the social poli-
cies of the Lula government; cf. Boschi & Gaitán, 2009) and
India is the only BRIC country that has considerably liber-
alized. Taxes and public spending also rose in China and
India, but more than in the richer Brazil this has probably
been the result of the fast modernization related to indus-
trialization and urbanization.
To see whether the OECD’s scores for Product Market Reg-
ulation and Employment Protection Legislation conﬁrm or
correct the IEF data we have to refer to Table 2. EPL informs
about the commodiﬁcation of labor, and in this text it is the
main indicator of the capital–labor relation. PRM is more
complex and consists of many sub-indicators. The ﬁrst layer
contains ‘state control’, ‘barriers to entrepreneurship’ and
‘barriers to trade and investment’, which all count for one
third in the overall PMR index. While the last two sub-
indicators are also part of the IEF and might balance the IEF
data, state control is speciﬁc to the PMR index. Sub-indicators
of state control are ‘public ownership’ and ‘involvement in
business operations’, which at a lower level are sub-
divided in ‘scope of public enterprise’, ‘price control’ and
a few other indicators (Wölﬂ, Wanner, Röhn, & Nicoletti,
2010, p. 8).
6 In the WGI the continuum runs from effective statism to non-effective
statism. In parallel the WGI includes a continuum from high to low cor-
ruption. This continuum is only indirectly related to the former one, but
we understand it as opposite to effective statism and therefore use it as a
residual category of patrimonialism (of which corruption is the main in-
gredient).
7 A general feature of the IEF is that the average country scores are rel-
atively close to each other. This is due to the systematics of the IEF. It implies
that the differences between the countries mentionedwould become larger
when the range from 30 to 100 would be set 0–100. From 0 to 30 there
are no overall scores. Something similar can be said about the PMR and
EPL scores with their scale from 0 to 6. There are nearly no scores higher
than 4.
8 The scores of the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency
International (2011) in many cases deviate from those of the IEF. In Russia,
for example, corruption has increased more in the CPI than in the IEF. Its
scoremoved from 2.4 in 1998 to 2.1 in 2008 (the lower the score, the higher
the corruption), while Brazil moved from 4.0 to 3.5, China remained stable
at 3.5 and India improved from 2.9 to 3.4.
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In the realm of PMR the results are very similar to that
in Table 1: Brazil was rather stable, China liberalized a bit,
India’s liberalization is worth mentioning, and Russia de-
liberalized considerably, although – contrasting the IEF
statistics – the country appears still more liberal than
China. We should not forget, however, that the BRICs’ scores
are derived from the data for 2003 and then have been
estimated for 1998 on the basis of their development in
the IEF (in the table indicated by brackets). Keeping in
mind that re-etatization by the Putin administration com-
menced around 2003, the Russian estimate should be
roughly correct. In India, China and Russia PMR is still
much more rigid than in the USA, and Brazil is in-
between. A look at the sub-domain of state control (the
extent to which governments inﬂuence ﬁrm decisions;
this indicator determines the PMR index for one third)
reveals a similar picture. In 2008 the USA scored 1.1, while
China (4.63), Russia (4.39) and India (3.58) still had a high
level of state control and Brazil (2.69) was again located
in-between. The development of the EPL level reveals a
similar picture. China and Brazil liberalized more than in
PMR, but the most signiﬁcant exception is Russia, where,
according to the data in the table, the level of employ-
ment protection did not change at all. This may be due to
the fact that no data are available before Putin’s reform of
the labor market in 2003. However, in part one we have
seen that on paper capital–labor relations were liberal-
ized under Putin, even though formal rules have been
undermined by patrimonial practices.
Now we can average the IEF, PMR and EPL scores to
calculate overall values of economic liberalism and, by
subtracting these scores from 100, overall scores of
embeddedness. However, depending on the level of cor-
ruption reality might differ from the intentions of law texts
and other codiﬁed regulations that the PMR and EPL indices
are based upon. For this reason it makes sense to adjust the
PMR and EPL ﬁgures for corruption. It will be done by using
the corruption data of the Index of Economic Freedom. In
Table 1 corruption determined the average scores for 20%.
Giving corruption with respect to PMR and the EPL the same
weight as in Table 1 the formula to be applied in Table 3 is
([2 × PMR] + [2 × EPL] + IEF-corruption)/5.
Table 3 conﬁrms that Russia was the only BRIC country
that de-liberalized between 1998 and 2008. This ﬁnding is
Table 3
Overall liberal scores in 1998 and 2008 (scaled 0–100).
Economic freedom average Average of PMR and EPL adjusted for corruptiona Overall liberal score Extent of embeddedness
1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008
Brazil 45.5 44.1 56.0 57.8 50.8 50.9 49.2 49.1
China 39.6 40.5 42.1 46.6 40.9 43.6 59.1 56.4
India 36.4 42.3 45.5 52.9 41.0 47.6 59.0 52.4
Russia 48.1 38.6 56.9 51.7 52.5 45.1 47.5 54.9
USA 73.7 82.1 78.9 82.2 76.3 82.2 23.7 17.8
aAdjusted by the corruption score of the Index of Economic Freedom; as in Table 1 it is related to four other scores, in this case to two times each the
converted PMR and EPL scores.
Table 4
Worldwide Governance Indicators 1998, 2008, scaled −2.5–2.5 and converted.
1: Government effectivenessa 2: Regulatory qualitya 3: Rule of lawa Converted average of 1, 2 and 3b
1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008
Brazil −0.13 0.00 0.44 0.07 −0.32 −0.37 50.0 48.0
China −0.14 0.19 −.026 −0.16 −0.37 −0.34 44.8 48.0
India −0.06 −0.02 −0.36 −0.33 −0.28 −0.08 45.4 47.2
Russia −0.76 −0.37 −0.47 −0.45 −0.94 −0.96 35.6 37.8
USA 1.76 1.52 1.62 1.55 1.59 1.66 83.1 81.6
Source: World Bank, 2012.
aScaled from −2.5 to 2.5.
b−2.5 is converted into 0, the original 0 into a converted 2.5, the original 2.5 into the converted 5 and all scores are multiplied by 20.
Table 5

















1998 2008 1998 1998 1998 2008 2008 2008 1998 2008
Brazil 50.8 50.9 50.0 49.2 24.6 48.0 49.1 23.6 24.6 25.6
China 40.9 43.6 44.8 59.1 26.5 48.0 56.4 27.1 32.6 29.3
India 41.0 47.6 45.4 59.0 26.8 47.2 52.4 24.7 32.2 27.7
Russia 52.5 45.1 35.6 47.5 16.9 37.8 54.9 20.8 30.6 34.1
USA 76.3 82.2 83.1 23.7 19.7 81.6 17.8 14.5 4.0 3.3
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in line with the case made in part one of the paper: Russia
underwent a de-liberalization in the 2000s. China and India
liberalized (for different views see Huang, 2008, on China
and Kohli, 2006, on India), while Brazil hardly changed. Based
on Table 3 we can draw a ﬁgure localizing the BRICs’ po-
litical economies on the axis between ideal–typical liberal
capitalism and ideal–typical embedded capitalism (Fig. 2).
Fractional digits are not relevant here. Since there are no
scores below 40, the axis starts at level 25.
3.3. Stage 2: indicating change in the ﬁeld between
liberalism, statism and patrimonialism
The next step is to divide the scores of embeddedness
into those of statism and patrimonialism. This will be ten-
tatively done on the basis of the values of the Worldwide
Governance Indicators – tentatively because the WGI data
are not exhaustive. Rather pointing to state capacity, WGI
data only indirectly indicate statism. Put into this perspec-
tive, we cautiously assume that the higher the WGI scores
for ‘government effectiveness’, ‘regulatory quality’ and ‘rule
of law’, the higher the level of statism within the residual
category of embeddedness. Table 4 shows the scores of the
WGI. In theWGI scale the highest score is 2.5 and the lowest
−2.5. Again, at ﬁrst sight it seems that the differences
between the BRICs and the USA are large. Yet the differ-
ences shrink when the WGI scores are converted in a
scale from 0 to 100 (column 4 of Table 4). With statist
embeddedness to be quantiﬁed in this table, patrimonial
embeddedness will be left in the basket as residual
category.
The most striking feature is that the Russian scores of
indicators 1–3 in both 1998 and 2008 are clearly below the
level of those of the other BRICs. The average value of the
Russian scores has slightly increased, although ‘regulatory
quality’ and ‘rule of law’ have not. This is roughly consis-
tent with the description in part one of this paper, which
noted a poor steering capability, a low facilitating state ca-
pacity as well as the weakness of the judicial system, which
is often misused by rent seeking oﬃcials to harass entre-
preneurs or extort bribes. Notably, the level of statist
embeddedness in Russia is still low, as suggested by the
average scores of the threeWGI indicators in the last column
of the table. This indicates that state involvement, which
should not be confused with statism, is more patrimonial
(i.e. based on particularistic gains) than statist (i.e. based
on universalist principles).
With the mentioned precision limits in mind, the level
of statism (S) can be determined on the basis of the pre-
ceding tables. It will be done by calculating the average
converted score of ‘government effectiveness’ (WGI1), ‘reg-
ulatory quality’ (WGI2) and ‘rule of law’ (WGI3) as percentage
of the extent of (statist/patrimonial) embeddedness (E) as
ﬁxed in Table 3. The formula is S = (WGI1+2+3) × E/100. Sub-
sequently, the residual level of patrimonialism (P) can be
established by subtracting statism (S) from the extent of
embeddedness (E): P = E − S. Table 5 shows the results.
The conclusion based on Table 5 is that at both points
in time, in 1998 and 2008, the BRICs represent a rather ho-
mogenous group of countries: all of them are much less
liberal than the USA and feature high levels of statism and
similarly high levels of patrimonialism. However, if we focus
not on points in time but on the process of change – the
core interest of this paper – we ﬁnd a different develop-
ment in Russia as compared to other BRICs. Themain ﬁnding
is that, based on our indicators, Russia moved into the op-
posite direction than the BRICs: it was the only country that
de-liberalized. India liberalized considerably, China liber-
alized somewhat, while Brazil hardly changed.9While Russia
was the most liberal BRIC country in 1998, it de-liberalized
so much that it became the second (after China) least liberal
BRIC country in 2008. Brazil was the most liberal country
in 2008, followed by India.
At the same time, Russia is revealed to be an outlier in
terms of patrimonialism: it was the country with the highest
level of patrimonialism and the only BRIC country where
patrimonialism considerably increased between 1998 and
2008. Based on our indicators, in 1998 the Russian level of
patrimonialism resembled that of China and India (in fact,
it was even lower), but in 2008 it clearly exceeded it. While
China and in particular India diminished their levels
of patrimonialism between 1998 and 2008, Russia’s
patrimonialism increased. As for Brazil, patrimonialism
hardly changed, but was signiﬁcantly lower than the Russian
value for both years. Moreover, Russian patrimonialism is
revealed to be much higher than the country’s level of
statism, which in both years was lower than in other BRICs.
This supports the analysis of part one of this paper
where we stressed that patrimonialism undermined both
the liberalization of the 1990s and the turn to statism in
the 2000s.
One might twist whether the WGI 1, 2 and 3 data are
appropriate indicators of statism and whether the residu-
al value, the only identiﬁable indicator of which is
corruption, truly reﬂects the level of patrimonialism. At this
moment, however, the IEF, PRM, EPL and WGI data are the
sole coherent basis for determining with some precision the
respective levels of liberalism, statism and patrimonialism
in emerging economies. Bearing these caveats in mind, we
9 For a detailed treatment of the trajectories of the BRICs, see
Becker (2013, p. 47ff) and the respective country chapters in the same
volume.
Fig. 2. Location of select political economies on the axis between the liberal and embedded ideal types in 1998 (beginning of arrow) and 2008 (end of
arrow).
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can comparatively map the development of Russian capi-
talism. This exercise has to give an impression of the
trajectory of change at a glance. Fractional digits and even
single percentage points will be ignored, and very small
differences like those between Brazil in 1998 and 2008
cannot be shown (on a ray of 10 cm, one index/percentage
point would be one millimeter). For the sake of clarity the
Chinese and Indian values, which are often very close to the
Russian ones, are not included. The comparative perspec-
tive is therefore limited to the highly liberal contrast case
of the USA and Brazil. The latter is somewhat similar to
Russia in terms of size and dependence on basic materials
(Fig. 3).
4. Concluding remarks
According to a widely shared interpretation, Russia’s po-
litical economy was liberalized since the early 1990s and
started a process of re-etatization a decade later. We have
amended this interpretation by a systematic incorpora-
tion of patrimonialism – political–economic organization
characterized by clientelistic state–business and capital–
labor relations as well as patronage. Thereby we built on
the work of scholars concerned with the interaction of the
patrimonial and the legal–rational sphere and proposed a
framework for assessing the scope of patrimonialism in Rus-
sia’s political economy and its impact on the country’s
trajectory of change.
We integrated patrimonialism into the analysis by con-
ceptualizing Russian political economy as a dynamic hybrid
of three ideal types of capitalism: liberalism, statism and
patrimonialism. This hybrid changed from a fairly liberal and,
to a considerable degree, patrimonial economic form in the
1990s to a less liberal, more statist and, notably, even more
patrimonial form in the course of the 2000s. Thus the main
direction of change was decreased liberalism and in-
creased patrimonialism.We showed that the latter decisively
affected Russia’s trajectory: in the 1990s patrimonialism un-
dermined the liberalization, turning it into a sell-off to rent-
seeking insiders; in the 2000s patrimonialism hindered the
rise of statism in the sense of higher facilitating state ca-
pacity. It was the coercive state capacity that rose – a
capacity in the context of which private enrichment of elite
groups, notably the siloviki, could ﬂourish. Similarly,
patrimonialism hindered the institutionalization of capital–
labor relations by sustaining patron–client networks,
perpetuating paternalistic arrangements between manag-
ers and workers, and by allowing somemanagers and trade
union functionaries to use the power of their respective po-
sitions for private appropriation of economic advantages.
We also conclude that Russian patrimonialism changed its
form between Yeltsin- and Putin-periods, from predomi-
nantly society-initiated to predominantly state-initiated. In
the 1990s patrimonialism had a largely bottom-up char-
acter with a central role of the oligarchs, while in the 2000s
it had a more top-down character with a central role of the
siloviki.
In comparative perspective themain ﬁnding is that Russia
was the only BRIC economy that de-liberalized in the decade
after the late 1990s, while Russian patrimonialism in-
creased to the highest level among the BRICs by 2008. Thus
in terms of trajectories of change, Russia is an outlier, even
though generally all BRICs share, relative to for instance ad-
vanced industrial economies, similar levels of relatively low
liberalism and relatively high statism and patrimonialism.
Generally, the statistics corroborate the paper’s conceptu-
al assessment and quantitatively reveal the direction of
change. The data also underscore that Russia’s re-etatization
Fig. 3. Russia, Brazil and contrast country USA mapped in the ﬁeld between three ideal types.* (*Each ray starts at zero in the center of the ﬁgure and has
a value of 100. 100 is also the true value of each spider wire over the three dimensions.).
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in the 2000s signals merely a rise of state involvement, not
a move to more statist political interventionism on the basis
of general rules. Government effectiveness, including the ef-
fectiveness of its coercive tasks, slightly increased, but
regulatory quality and the presence of the rule of law
remained at their very low levels. In other words, the Russian
state increased its political–economic involvement
not in universalistic terms, but in particularistic, patrimo-
nial terms.
The empirical contribution of the above study is the
quantitative assessment and comparative mapping of the
trajectories of change in emerging economies offered
here with reference to the BRICs. The suggested tool
operationalizes and combinesmeasures of liberalism, statism
and patrimonialism in ways that can be applied to other
comparative studies and time periods, and should enhance
our understanding of other emerging economies.
In theoretical terms, the main contribution is our con-
ception of ‘varieties of capitalism’ that take explicit account
of patrimonialism. We have argued that patrimonialism is
more than an incidental feature like corruption or blemish
on a particular type of capitalism. Instead, it is a compet-
ing logic of economic and social organization that
systematically obstructs and undermines ideal–typical lib-
eralism and statism. More generally, political economies
beyond the OECDworld feature high levels of patrimonialism
and cannot be adequately understood without the system-
atic attention to this clientelistic, particularistic dimension
of politico-economic organization.
In this context, our study may have established some
useful theoretical and empirical ground rules for under-
standing the role of patrimonialism in comparative political
economy, but it has only touched upon questions pertain-
ing to the origins of patrimonialism and its impact on
economic development. The study has been able to say little
about where a given country’s or period’s combination of
liberalism, etatism and patrimonialism might come from.
What role do external factors, ideological conditions,
and technological or political conﬂict play in shaping
the persistence of patrimonialism in Russian political
economy relative to its BRICs counterparts, and in recent
decades compared to the early post-Cold War period? An
in-depth analysis of the origins and workings of Russian
patrimonialism is yet to be done. Just as important, the
present study has been able to say little about the impli-
cations of patrimonialism for development goals. Which
levels of patrimonialism are detrimental for economic de-
velopment? Might patrimonialism in some ways ‘facilitate’
and compensate for the shortcomings of the formal system?
All such questions we must leave for further study, but the
present portrayal of patrimonialism as central descriptor of
Russian and BRIC political economies underscores their
urgency.
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Appendix: List of interviews
Position Date Code
Business association executive, Moscow 3.04.2014 A1
Entrepreneur/M, sewing factory, Moscow
Oblast
4.04.2014 B1
Entrepreneur/S, publishing house, Moscow 4.04.2014 B2
Entrepreneur/S, retail, Moscow 6.04.2014 B3
Business association executive, Moscow 7.04.2014 A2
Lawyer, Moscow 7.04.2014 L1
Lawyer, Moscow 7.04.2014 L2
Journalist, Moscow 8.04.2014 J1
Business association executive, Moscow 8.04.2014 A3
Entrepreneur/S, PR agency, Moscow 8.04.2014 B4
Entrepreneur/S, street food, Moscow 8.04.2014 B5
Academic, Moscow 9.04.2014 E1




Entrepreneur/S, private kindergarten, Moscow 10.04.2014 B8




Journalist, Moscow 11.04.2014 J2
Entrepreneur/S, translation agency, Moscow 11.04.2014 B11




Entrepreneur/S, retail, Moscow 15.04.2014 B13
Entrepreneur/M, manufacturing (metal),
Vishniy Volochek (Tver Oblast)
15.04.2014 B14




Entrepreneur/M*, manufacturing (plastic), St.
Petersburg
17.04.2014 B17
Entrepreneur/M*, manufacturing (metal), St.
Petersburg
17.04.2014 B18
Entrepreneur/S, retail, Moscow 18.04.2014 B19
Entrepreneur/M, retail, Moscow 21.04.2014 B20




Academic, Moscow 22.04.2014 E4
Entrepreneur/S, manufacturing (industrial
fans), Zelenograd (Moscow Oblast)
22.04.2014 B22
Entrepreneur/S, car retail, Moscow 23.04.2014 B23
Entrepreneur = owner of small- (/S) or medium-sized (/M) business.
*CEO.
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